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I. Introduction 
Increased integration of the global economy has changed relative incomes around the 
world. For instance, competition from imports of relatively low-skill intensive 
products has a downward pressure on wages for unskilled workers in wealthy nations 
and contributes to widening income disparities (e.g. Baldwin, 1994). Less attention 
has been given to the effect of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on income disparities. 
This is unfortunate since FDI has increased dramatically both in size and importance 
during the last decades, growing faster than international trade.  
 One aspect of FDI and wages which has received attention, is the relatively 
high wages in foreign-owned firms. It seems to be a universal rule that in every 
country, foreign-owned firms tend to pay higher average wages than domestically-
owned ones.
1 However, more detailed analyses of individuals’ wages find that part of 
this wage difference can be attributed to differences in worker characteristics, and 
that foreign-owned firms pay higher wages than local non-multinational firms, but not 
higher than local multinational firms (Heyman et al., 2004). Hence, it is not the 
nationality of the firm that is of importance for wages, but whether it is a 
multinational or a non-multinational firm, which is also what is to be expected from 
economic theory (see e.g. Markusen, 2004).  
Although average wages do not seem to differ between local and foreign-
owned firms, there might be a difference in the wage structures. There are reasons to 
expect multinational firms in general, and perhaps foreign multinationals in 
particular, to pay comparably high wages for key employees. For instance, 
multinational firms might pay a wage premium to high-skilled workers to avoid labor 
turnover and the resulting loss of their firm-specific advantages. Furthermore, foreign 
                                                 
1 See Görg and Greenaway (2004) and Lipsey (2004) for two surveys on FDI and wages.   3
MNCs might import foreign wage structures to their affiliates; wage structures that 
might differ from wages in local firms.  
There are few studies on the impact of foreign acquisitions on wage 
dispersion. In studies on average wage levels at an industry level, Taylor and 
Driffield (2005) find FDI to have a positive effect on wage dispersion in the UK, 
whereas Bloningen and Slaughter (1999) find no such effect in the US. There are also 
two studies touching upon the issue at a more disaggregated level. Girma and Görg 
(2003) use UK establishment data with the average wage of the workforce and find 
non-production workers to benefit from US acquisitions, whereas production workers 
only benefit in some industries. Thus, the results are suggesting that wage dispersion 
might increase after foreign acquisitions. Huttunen (2004) also examines average 
wages at the plant level in Finland. She finds a positive effect of foreign acquisition 
on wages which increases with the average schooling of the workers, implying 
increased wage dispersion from inflows of FDI.  
This paper uses matched employer-employee data to examine whether 
foreign-owned firms differ from Swedish-owned firms in their wages to different 
types of workers. We contribute to the literature on FDI and wages in several 
respects. First, we use the individual worker’s wage rather than firm or industry 
averages. Detailed matched employer-employee data, roughly covering 50 percent of 
the Swedish labor force, enables us to take into account individual- and firm 
heterogeneity when we estimate how ownership changes affect wage dispersion. 
Matching methods are used to control for possible endogeneity of foreign 
acquisitions. 
Second, we can distinguish foreign acquisitions of domestic MNCs from 
acquisitions of local Swedish firms. We also analyze Swedish acquisitions of foreign-  4
owned firms, which allow us to examine if ownership, firm type, or the acquisition 
itself affect wage dispersion.  
Third, the often used categories “white collar vs. blue collar” and “production 
and non production workers” are highly heterogeneous within each class and 
constitute crude measures on skill levels. We use detailed information on education 
and job categories that is more closely related to skills. For example, among workers 
with high-skilled jobs, we are not only able to identify managers, but also the CEO 
and thereby, we can examine the impact of acquisitions on very specific groups of 
employees. 
Our results suggest that foreign acquisitions of Swedish firms tend to have a 
positive impact on wages for high-skilled workers and a negative impact on wages for 
low-skilled workers, thus increasing wage dispersion. A more detailed breakdown of 
skill groups shows the positive impact of an acquisition to be concentrated to 
managers and the CEO in targeted firms, whereas other groups are either negatively 
affected or not affected at all by the change. As a consequence, the major part of the 
increased wage dispersion following acquisitions can be attributed to differences in 
the impact on wages between managers and CEOs on the one hand and the rest of the 
work force on the other. The positive influence on wages for high-skilled workers 
seems to be caused by the acquisition itself, rather than by the change of ownership, 
since ownership changes from foreign to Swedish also result in similar increases.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses reasons for differences 
in the wage structure between different types of firms. Section III describes the data. 
Section IV contains the econometric methodology. Results are presented in Section V 
and the paper ends with some concluding remarks in Section VI. 
      5
II. Conceptual Framework 
FDI is likely to have an impact on wages, most obviously by increasing the demand 
for labor. FDI is also likely to have different effects on different types of workers. 
More precisely, multinational firms will locate production in a country partly due to 
the country’s comparative advantage, thereby increasing demand for the abundant 
production factor which, in a country like Sweden, is likely to be skilled workers.
2 
  Once more, this paper focuses on the effect of acquisitions on wages for 
different skill groups. The issue has not been elaborated to any considerable extent in 
the literature, but there is some theoretical work that might be used as a framework 
for our study. 
  First, the theory on the multinational firm, as expressed by for instance 
Dunning (1988), stresses the aspect of ownership advantages as a determinant of 
firms’ competitiveness in foreign markets. Ownership advantage can be a brand name 
but it can also be specific technologies, distribution, and marketing systems. Since 
ownership advantages are important for the firm’s competitiveness, it will try to 
guard them and restrict access to them by other competitors.  
  One way of restricting such access is by trying to reduce labor turnover. In 
other words, competitors can get access to, for instance, the firm’s technologies by 
recruiting some of the firm’s employees, and it is in the firm’s interest to avoid such 
recruitment. The multinational firm might avoid the loss of employees by paying a 
wage premium. Presumably, the firm does not have to pay such a wage premium to 
all its employees, but only to those workers who might bring some of the firm-
specific advantage with them if they join a competitor. It is plausible that such 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Karpaty and Lundberg (2004).   6
workers are mainly found among top-level employees and various specialists. Hence, 
we can expect increased wage dispersion when MNCs acquire non-MNCs. 
Second, an acquisition can be an opportunity to renegotiate contracts and 
perform organizational changes (Schleifer and Summers, 1988; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003). Ownership changes are typically followed by a “shake out”: a 
period of rationalizations. The management might require a wage premium to be 
willing to pursue such changes. Moreover, it is also likely that the new owners will 
depend on the management’s knowledge of the firm and its network. However, there 
are no reasons to expect this mechanism to be specific for foreign acquisitions.  
Finally, foreign-owned firms applying the wage structure used in foreign 
markets will lead to a difference in wages between foreign and domestic firms. 
Swedish wage differentials are small in an international comparison (see e.g. Blau 
and Kahn, 1996; Björklund et al., 1998). High-skilled workers, in particular, have 
comparably low wages in Sweden. It is possible that foreign-owned firms would find 
it difficult, or undesirable, to differentiate between similar employees in different 
countries. If this hypothesis were correct, we would expect foreign MNCs to raise 
wages for high-skilled workers in acquired Swedish firms. 
As seen by the above discussion, the theoretical framework for analyzing the 
issue at hand is fragmented. It should also be noted that there are other theoretical 
papers where inflows of FDI can increase or decrease wage dispersion, depending on 
the assumptions made on, for instance, the initial equilibrium or the underlying 
parameter changes on trade costs and factor endowments (Markusen and Venables, 
1998). The ambiguous theoretical results stress the importance of more empirical 
research to better understand the impact of FDI on wage dispersion. This paper 
contributes to this task.   7
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this study comes from one individual-level based data set (LS) and 
one firm-level based dataset (FS) from Statistics Sweden. The data sets are linked by 
unique tracking numbers. The analysis covers the period 1996 to 2000 and uses firms 
with at least 20 employees in the entire private sector (manufacturing and non 
manufacturing). The individual wage statistics data set (LS) contains individual wage 
statistics based on Statistics Sweden’s annual salary surveys and is supplemented by 
material from a series of official data registers.
3 The dataset encompasses information 
on approximately 2 million observations per year (accounting for roughly 50% of the 
labor force) and includes information on workers’ full-time equivalent wages, 
education, labor market experience, working hours, gender and occupation (job) 
codes. 
The firm-level data is obtained from financial statistics (FS). This data covers 
all Swedish firms with at least 20 employees and contains information on a large 
number of variables including capital stocks, sales, value added, firm size, 
investments, R&D, ownership, and industry affiliation. 
To separate out different types of firms, we divide our sample into three 
groups: foreign-owned MNCs, locally-owned MNCs, and locally-owned non-MNCs. 
A firm is a foreign-owned MNC if, according to information in the financial statistics, 
more than 50 percent of the equity is foreign owned. We define a locally-owned 
MNC as a firm reporting positive exports to other firms within the corporation. 
                                                 
3 The sampling units of the survey consist of firms that are included in Statistics Sweden’s firm data 
base (FS). A representative sample of firms is drawn from FS, stratified according to industry 
affiliation and firm size (number of employees). The sample size consists of between 8,000 and 11,000 
firms for the period 1996-2000. The Central Confederation of Private Employers then provides 
employee information to Statistics Sweden on all its member firms that have (i) at least ten employees 
and (ii) are included in the sample. Firms with at least 500 employees are examined with probability 
one. The final sample includes information on around 50 percent of all employees within the entire 
private section.   8




- Table 1 about here - 
  
Most firms are locally-owned non-MNCs, followed by foreign-owned MNCs and 
locally-owned MNCs. Our analysis focuses on acquisitions: firms changing 
ownership from foreign to local or from local to foreign. As seen in Table 1, the 
number of foreign acquisitions of domestically owned firms has increased from 
around 100 in 1997 to around 200 in 2000. The number of acquisitions of foreign-
owned firms has also increased but remains relatively small. 
In the analysis, we restrict our sample to those firms observed for at least four 
consecutive years. This means that for e.g. Swedish firms acquired by a foreign 
owner at period (t), we only consider firms that are Swedish owned at (t-1) and 
remain foreign owned at year (t+1) and (t+2). The same restriction applies to 
individuals. As for their employing firms, we restrict individuals to remain in the 
same firm during the period of observation of the firm. This restriction enables us to 
control for both individual and firm-specific effects when analyzing the impact of 
foreign ownership on wages. It also means that we don’t have to worry about the 
issue of endogenous job switchers, implying that part of an estimated foreign 
ownership effect can be caused by individuals switching firms through, for instance, 
promotions which, in turn, have a separate impact on wages. By restricting our 
sample to individuals who do not change employers, we directly focus on the effect 
                                                 
4 Export information is available for firms with at least 50 employees or smaller firms with large sales. 
There might exist a few small multinationals that are classified as local firms, due to missing 
information on exports. The potential bias is likely to be slight, but it presumably means that the 
difference between MNCs and non-MNCs could be slightly larger than that presented in Section V.   9
of the change in ownership. Descriptive statistics on our sub-sample of individuals 
and firms are presented in Table 2, together with figures on the share of each group of 
firms in total industry value added.   
  
- Table 2 about here - 
  
Local MNCs account for the largest share of value added, 39.5 percent, followed by 
local non-MNCs with 37.7 percent and foreign MNCs with 23.6 percent. Table 2 
shows that foreign- and domestic-owned MNCs tend to be rather similar, and that 
domestic non-MNCs tend to differ from MNCs in some respects. More precisely, 
non-MNCs are relatively small in size, have a high proportion of female workers, and 
pay relatively low wages. Finally, domestically-owned MNCs tend to show higher 
profits per employee as compared to foreign-owned MNCs and locally-owned non-
MNCs. 
Table 2 also shows higher wages in MNCs than in local firms. This is true for 
both domestic and foreign MNCs. The average wage for employees in domestic-
owned and foreign-owned MNCs is around 21,500 SEK and around 19,700 SEK for 
workers in local firms. Finally, non-MNCs employ a relatively high share of females 
and also have older and more experienced workers.    
  It is important for our analysis that we adequately distinguish between 
workers with different skills. The most common way of doing this in the literature is 
to use blue- and white-collar workers, or production and non-production workers. 
This is a crude distinction. For instance, white-collar workers include the manager, 
but also the person emptying his dustbin; blue-collar workers include the truck driver, 
but also the specialist installing and running various types of high-tech machinery.    10
  We use two different criteria to separate between high- and low-skilled 
workers to avoid drawing conclusions based on results caused by poor and crude 
distinctions. The data categorizes each worker to one of 105 different job-types based 
on the international standard classification of occupations (ISCO-88), and we 
aggregate these job-types to three broader categories. More precisely, managers and 
specialists are considered as high-skilled, workers engaged in various service 
functions and sales are considered as medium-skilled, and the rest are characterized 
as low-skilled. According to this definition, high-skilled workers constitute 17 percent 
of the total workforce, medium-skilled workers about 44 and low-skilled about 37 
percent. As expected, high-skilled workers have the highest salaries followed by 
medium-skilled and low-skilled (see the upper part of Table 2).  
The workers’ educational background is an alternative measure on skill. More 
precisely, we have divided workers into three groups: workers with tertiary education, 
secondary education, or not more than primary education. The use of education 
makes the high-skilled group and low-skilled group smaller as compared to the 
distinction according to job-types. The shares of high-, medium-, and low-skilled 
according to education are 9, 65 and 23 percent, respectively. Wages remain 
relatively high for high-skilled workers and low for low-skilled workers (Table 2).  
Table 2 also compares wages between skill groups for different types of firms. 
The average wage is lowest in Swedish non-MNCs for all skill groups and these firms 
also exhibit the lowest wage dispersion. 
The imposed restrictions on firm survival and workers remaining in the same 
firm may lead to a sample selection bias. Therefore, we calculated the sample 
statistics without any restrictions. Our restrictions seem to have a very small impact 
on our calculations. For example, the average wage for workers in local Swedish   11
firms, Swedish MNCs, and foreign-owned firms changes from SEK 19 693, 21 595, 
and 21 364 to 18 966, 21 197, and 20 570 respectively. The effect on the labor force 
composition is even smaller, but the restrictions leave us with slightly larger and more 
capital intensive firms.
5 
  As highlighted by Shleifer and Summers (1989) and Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003), acquisitions may trigger a reconstruction of the firm. In Table 3, 
we present some descriptive statistics on the “shakeout effect” following an 
acquisition. A number of interesting conclusions can be drawn. For instance, acquired 
firms tend to shrink in size as compared to non-acquired firms. This downsizing may 
be caused by a centralization of administrative units to the parent firm. The 
composition of different skill groups remains almost unaffected two years after an 
acquisition, but wages seem to be declining. Hence, the difference in skill 
compositions between MNCs and non-MNCs (Table 2) seems to be a selection effect 
rather than being caused by a transformation of acquired firms.  
As we have detailed information on individuals’ jobs, we are able to trace the 
wage development for very specific groups of employees, such as the CEOs. The 
survival ratio of CEOs in acquired firms is 58 percent after one year and 37 percent 
after two years (not shown). This can be compared with the survival rate for CEOs in 
firms that are not acquired by foreign owners, which is 71 and 55 percent 
respectively. Hence, CEOs tend to be relatively footloose and an acquisition increases 
the likelihood that the CEO will leave the firm.  
  
- Table 3 about here - 
  
                                                 
5 Unrestricted sample statistics are available upon request.   12
The final row in Table 3 shows that of those CEOs that stay with the firm after 
a foreign acquisition, roughly 30 percent are moved into another position (within the 
firm) two years after the acquisition.  
  
IV. Econometric Methodology 
Our analysis will be based on the following augmented Mincer equation: 
 
) 1 ( 3 F 2 X S O 2 S 1 0 ln ijt t j i jt ijt
SSijt jt S ijt S ijt w ε λ η α β β β β β + + + + ′ + ′ + ∑∑ + + =  
where wit is the full-time equivalent monthly wage for worker i in firm j  at time t; O 
is a foreign ownership dummy for firm j, the foreign ownership dummy is 1 if at least 
50 percent of the equity is foreign owned, and zero otherwise; S is the skill level of 
worker i defined according to job type or educational level, Ojt*Sijt is an interaction 
between ownership and skill, capturing the wage premium for different skill groups 
working in a certain firm type, X is a vector of individual characteristics including 
gender and labor market experience, F contains firm-level variables such as (log) firm 
size, profits per employee, capital intensity, and industry affiliation. Finally, αi, λt, 
and  ηj are fixed individual-, time- and firm-effects, respectively, and εijt is the 
classical error term.  
Foreign-owned firms may, in some unobserved characteristics, differ from 
domestically owned firms which, in turn, might explain wage differences. One way of 
controlling for this bias is by examining firms that change ownership. In other words, 
we would not expect any change in wages following an acquisition, if it is 
unobserved firm- or individual characteristics, rather than ownership itself that 
explain the wages. Therefore, we restrict the analysis to firms changing ownership 
from domestic to foreign or from foreign to domestic.   13
To isolate the impact of multinational status, we also analyze foreign 
acquisitions of both Swedish MNCs and local Swedish firms.  
 
Propensity score matching and difference-in-difference 
One problem with estimating the causal effect of an acquisition on wages concerns 
the endogeneity of firms being acquired. In other words, it is not likely to be random 
which firms are acquired and acquired firms might exhibit characteristics 
systematically differing from the characteristics of other firms. Moreover, and 
analogously to the problem in the evaluation literature of non-random treatment 
groups, the characteristics of the firms that become foreign owned might be such that 
they would in any case develop differently than their non-acquired counterparts. This 
means that estimates on outcome variables (such as wages) become biased.  
We approach this problem by way of propensity score matching combined 
with the more general difference-in-differences (d-i-d) technique. Let A∈{T,C} be an 
acquisition indicator equal to T for firms being acquired (the treatment group) and 
equal to C for firms that do not change ownership status (the control group).
T
s t i w + ,  
denote the wage at time t+s for a firm i that has been acquired at time t, and 
C
s t i w + ,  is 
the wage that would have been observed if the firm had not been acquired. Obviously, 
no firm can be observed in two different states at the same time, so either 
T
s t i w + ,  or 
C
s t i w + ,  is missing for each firm i. This fundamental problem of causal inference is 
sometimes described as the evaluation problem of missing data. However, under 
certain assumptions, the expected average treatment effect for the population of firms 
can instead be identified. This effect is equal to 








s t = − = = = − + + + + . Matching techniques can   14
be used to construct a sample of non-acquired twins to the acquired firms and, thus, 
approximate the non-observed counterfactual event in the last term. The difference-
in-difference approach compares wage changes for the treated group of acquired 
firms with some relevant control group of firms that are not acquired. This amounts to 
estimating ) ( ) (








t w w w w − − − = β , where β is the unknown d-i-d parameter and 
t0 and t1 are the time periods before and after an acquisition. 
The matching procedure in this paper uses the algorithms provided by Becker 
and Ichino (2002) and Leuven and Sianesi (2003). The propensity score is estimated 
with the Nearest-Neighbor method, without replacements.
6 The balancing property of 
the propensity score is tested and satisfied in all estimations.
7 Since we have a panel 
of firms and individuals observed over time, the matching of firms is calculated year-
by-year using lagged covariates. Having obtained a control group of firms, we then 
proceed to estimate the impact of acquisitions on individual wages by means of 
combining propensity score matching with the difference-in-difference estimator, as 
suggested by Blundell and Costa Dias (2000). This means that we can examine the 
dynamic effects of takeovers on wages. 
The d-i-d estimator will be estimated from the following individual wage 
equation: 
 
) 2 ( 1 ln ijt t ij T ijt After
s s ijt w ε η δ β + + + ∑ = , 
  
where  ijt After  is a dummy variable that is equal to one for the periods after the 
employing firm has been acquired, and zero otherwise. T is a fixed acquisition 
                                                 
6 See Heyman et al. (2004) for more details on the matching. 
7 We use observations in the region of common support only.   15
(group) effect that that is equal to one if the firm belongs to the treatment group, and 
zero otherwise. This dummy variable captures level differences between acquired and 
non-acquired firms before the acquisition. The time effect  t η  captures aggregate 
period effects that are common between the two groups. The estimated d-i-d effect of 
an acquisition for different skill-groups is given by the β’s. All estimated regressions 
include the same set of individual, firm and industry controls as in equation (1). 
 
V. Results 
Table 4 shows wages for individuals working in firms changing ownership from 
domestic to foreign.  
 
- Table 4 about here - 
 
  High-skill workers benefit from foreign acquisitions. The wage premium is 
small, however; around one percent, irrespective if education or job-types are used as 
the skill indicator. Moreover, the wage premium is larger after acquisitions of 
Swedish MNCs than after acquisitions of Swedish local firms, suggesting that there 
might be a different mechanism than internalization which explains the wage 
premium after an acquisition. 
  Wages for medium-skilled and low-skilled workers decrease substantially 
after a foreign-acquisition: by around six and four percent, respectively, in 
estimations with education, and by around three and six percent, respectively, in 
estimations with job-types. The negative effect on wages is larger after foreign 
acquisitions of Swedish MNCs than after acquisitions of local Swedish firms. Hence,   16
our results suggest increased wage dispersion following an acquisition, independent 
of what type of firm is acquired.  
The above estimations on foreign takeovers are biased if foreigners are 
targeting firms that also exhibit certain specific characteristics affecting wages. 
Therefore, we use a matched sample of non-targeted firms in estimations 9-12. The 
results remain relatively stable using the matched sample; foreign acquisitions lead to 
increased high-skill wages and decreased medium- and low-skill wages. However, the 
coefficients change and the positive effect on high-skill wages increases from roughly 
1.5 percent to 4.2-5.2 percent. On the other hand, the negative effect on medium- and 
low-skilled wages is lower than in the unmatched sample. Hence, the matching seems 
to shift the distribution of wage effects to the right.   
As a robustness test, we re-estimated models 1 through 6 in Table 4, relaxing 
the imposed restrictions on firms and workers. The number of observations then 
increased from roughly 1.2 million to 4.2 million. Relaxing the restrictions only had a 
minor effect and did not upset the result of increased wage dispersion following an 
acquisition. For instance, the wage premium for workers with tertiary-, secondary-, 
and primary education changed from 0.015, -0.038, and -0.059 to 0.054, -0.012, and -
0.030, respectively. Using job types, high-, medium- and low skilled jobs, the wage 
premium changed from 0.015, -0.057, and -0.033 to 0.043, -0.016, and -0.023. Hence, 
relaxing the restrictions affects the point estimates but leaves the overall picture 
unchanged.
8  
  An alternative way of capturing the impact of an acquisition, reflecting the 
dynamic pattern, is to use difference-in-difference (d-i-d) estimations. Results from 
combining matching techniques and d-i-d are presented in Table 5. 
                                                 
8 Estimations on the full unrestricted sample are available upon request.   17
 
- Table 5 about here - 
 
As seen in Table 5, the positive wage effect for highly educated workers and the 
negative effect for low- and medium educated workers remain. The results are less 
clear when we use job types, but still indicate increasing wage dispersion by a 
comparably large wage decline for low-skilled jobs. 
If the increased wage dispersion after a foreign acquisition is caused by the 
ownership change itself, rather than the change from domestic to foreign control, we 
would expect to see similar patterns also after other types of ownership changes. This 
possibility is examined in Table 6 where domestic acquisitions of foreign firms are 
studied.  
 
- Table 6 about here - 
 
The results in Table 6 show a wage increase for high-skilled workers after an 
ownership change from foreign to Swedish. The magnitudes are slightly larger than 
for the corresponding changes from Swedish to foreign.
9 However, domestic 
acquisitions of foreign-owned firms do not depress wages for medium- and low-
skilled workers. Hence, ownership changes in themselves have a general positive 
effect on high-skilled workers’ wages, thereby increasing wage dispersion 
irrespective of whether the acquired firm is an MNC, or whether the change is from 
foreign- to domestic ownership or from domestic- to foreign ownership.  
                                                 
9 See Tables 4 and 6.    18
  One possible explanation as to why the benefits of an acquisition are 
concentrated to skilled workers could be a strategy by new owners to keep key 
personnel in the company. Such personnel may possess important knowledge and 
networks which are essential for the new owners to keep in the firm. Moreover, 
Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that takeovers are often followed by a 
renegotiation of labor contracts and the abolishment of extra-marginal wages. It is 
possible, though, that the new owners must pay a wage premium to key personnel in 
the firm to make them willing to pursue such deteriorations of other employees’ 
contracts and, at the same time, keep the network of the firm intact. However, high-
skill is a broad concept and our categories include a large number of different job-
types. It is not obvious that all workers classified as “skilled workers” need to be 
compensated. To examine this issue, we disaggregate the high-skill group and 
specifically look at the effect on wages of, first, all managers (estimations 1-3; 7) and 
second, on the wages of CEOs (estimations 4-6; 8). These results are shown in Table 
7. 
 
- Table 7 about here - 
 
It is strikingly clear that the higher up in the job-hierarchy, the higher is the wage 
premium from a change in ownership. Starting with foreign takeovers, these 
managers increase their wages, compared to managers that remain working in a 
Swedish firm, by between 1 and 3 percent. The effect is even higher for CEOs: 
around 5 percent. Moreover, separating out managers has a negative effect on the 
remaining group of high-skill employees with no remaining wage premium. Hence, 
the only group of workers that (in terms of wages) benefits from an acquisition is   19
managers in general and the CEO in particular. Hence, results suggest that only key 
persons benefit from an acquisition. 
  Analyzing takeovers of foreign firms confirms earlier findings: a positive 
effect on wages for managers and CEOs that is of similar size as those found for 
foreign takeovers and, after removing managers from the group of skilled employees, 
a decreased coefficient for the remaining group of skilled workers.
10 Hence, the 
results might suggest that to successfully carry out an acquisition, the acquiring firm 
favors key personnel, while the position of other groups is weakened.  
     
VI. Concluding Remarks 
Global integration presumably affects relative wages. Whereas the issue of trade and 
wages has received substantial attention in the literature, less is known about how 
inflow of FDI affects relative wages. This is unfortunate, considering the important 
and growing role of FDI in the global economy. In this paper, we have analyzed the 
impact of acquisitions on wages and wage dispersion in Sweden. To achieve this task, 
we divided workers into different skill groups according to job types and educational 
background.  
It is clear from our analysis that acquisitions affect relative wages. The wage 
benefit of acquisitions is strongly concentrated to managers in general and to the CEO 
in particular.   
Out of CEOs that remain in the firm after an acquisition, two thirds are still 
CEOs two years after the firm was acquired. These CEOs increase their salary by 
around five percent as compared to CEOs in firms that are not acquired. 
                                                 
10 The estimations on foreign takeovers were also made on the matched sample of firms (not shown) 
and the results are only slightly larger coefficient values than those reported for the unmatched sample 
in Table 9.   20
The wage premium to other managers is also positive, but smaller in size. 
Wages for other high-skilled workers are not considerably affected by an acquisition, 
but wages for medium- and low-skilled workers decline when foreign owners acquire 
Swedish firms. More specifically, foreign acquisitions decrease wages by around six 
percent for medium-skilled workers and by around three to four percent for low-
skilled workers.  
It is worth emphasizing that it does not seem to be internationalization that is 
affecting wages. Foreign acquisitions of Swedish MNCs that are already 
internationalized have roughly the same effect as foreign acquisitions of Swedish 
local firms.  
Accordingly, the positive wage effect for managers and CEOs seems to be 
caused by the acquisition itself, and not by the kind of ownership. Foreign 
acquisitions of Swedish-owned firms and domestic acquisitions of foreign-owned 
firms result in very similar increases in wages for management and CEOs. One 
plausible explanation is that the new owners pay a wage premium to the management 
to, first, persuade these individuals to remain in the company, thereby ensuring that 
the knowledge about the firm and its network is intact and, second, to ensure that they 
participate in the shakeout that might follow after an acquisition. 
The conclusion from our paper is that FDI increases wage dispersion: the 
inflow of FDI to Sweden between 1996 and 2000 only had a positive effect on wages 
for CEOs and management. The reason for this development is uncertain, but seems 
to be more related to the acquisitions themselves than to increased 
internationalization.  
Our results lead to new questions. An obvious one is how to develop the 
theory of acquisitions and how contracts are negotiated during an acquisition.   21
Another question is how the results compare to purely domestic acquisitions. 
Unfortunately, we cannot examine such takeovers with our data. There are, however, 
a few studies on domestic acquisitions and wages.
11 The evidence from these studies 
are mixed. Though our results are not perfectly comparable with pure domestic 
acquisitions, the mixed results might be driven by the same asymmetric impact of 
acquisitions on high- and low skilled workers that we find in our study. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Number of firms and acquisitions by ownership in Sweden 1996-2000. 
  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 
Swedish Locally-owned non-MNCs  8 981  9 300  10 254  10 274  10 737 
Swedish  MNCs  621  1,087  939 800 859 
Foreign MNCs  1 360  1 460  1 594  1 725  1 885 
Foreign acquisitions of locally owned firms  ---  118  162  194  207 
Domestic acquisitions of foreign-owned MNCs  ---  57  45  44  76 
Note: Figures in the table are based on data on all firms with at least 20 employees in the 
Finance Statistics data set (FS). 
 
 







Individual statistics 1996-2000.  Stdv. within parenthesis (.) 
Monthly average wage  19 693     (7094)  21 595    (8400)  21 364    (8732) 
Wage high-skill jobs  27 555  31 284  31 045 
Wage medium-skill jobs  19 026  20 228  19 859 
Wage low-skill jobs  16 847  18 287  17 154 
Wage high education  28 751  32 814  32 917 
Wage medium education  19 335  20 667  20 762 
Wage low education  17 479  18 619  18 209 
Share female  0.42         (0.49)  0.27         (0.44)  0.30        (0.46) 
Share of high-educated  0.082       (0.27)  0.11        (0.31)  0.10        (0.30) 
Share of med-educated  0.69         (0.46)  0.67        (0.47)  0.63        (0.48) 
Share of low-educated  0.22         (0.42)  0.22        (0.41)  0.26        (0.44) 
Share of high-job  0.17         (0.38)  0.17        (0.37)  0.19        (0.40) 
Share of med-job  0.47         (0.50)  0.57        (0.49)  0.57        (0.49) 
Share of low-job  0.35         (0.48)  0.26        (0.44)  0.23        (0.42) 
Experience  26.1         (10.9)  23.6        (11.2)  24.9        (11.2) 
Age of employees  44            (10.2)  42           (10.6)  43           (10.4) 
No of obs.  774 757  547 375  298 068 
Firm statistics 1996-2000 Stdv. within parenthesis (.) 
Firm size  375        (1583)  947        (2379)  574        (776) 
log Capital intensity  0.63       (1.88)  0.67       (1.11)  0.60      (1.34) 
Profit per employee  1.18       (13.9)  1.95       (15.3)  1.08      (317) 
Sales per employee  19.6       (37.4)  20.76     (31.2)  26.2      (47.8) 
No of obs.  3 522  1 026  1 007 
Share of tot value added  37.7  39.5  23.6 
Note: Figures are based on the sub-sample of firms and workers in the employer-employee linked 
data. See Section III for details. 
 
 
   24
Table 3. Acquisition shakeout: ratios, acquired to non-acquired firms. 
 t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
Size  1.161 1.104 1.068 1.055 
Share  high  educated  1.005 0.953 0.974 1.015 
Share  medium  educated  1.005 1.017 1.008 1.004 
Share  low  educated  0.987 1.001 1.002 0.981 
Salary  high  educated  1.221 1.160 1.185 1.154 
Salary  medium  educated  1.067 1.073 1.074 1.062 
Salary  low  educated  1.076 1.038 1.028 1.054 
Percent of CEOs remaining in the firm as CEOs, 
conditional on presence in t-1 and staying in the 









Note: Figures correspond to foreign acquisitions of domestic firms. 
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Table 4. The effect of foreign takeovers of Swedish firms. Individual fixed-effect estimations (dependent variable – log monthly wage). 
 Unmatched  Sample  Matched  Sample 
  Vs all  Vs all  Vs MNCs  Vs MNCs  Vs Local  Vs Local  Vs all  Vs all  Vs MNCs  Vs MNCs  Vs Local  Vs Local 
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Table 5. Difference-in-difference estimations. Foreign takeover of Swedish firms 
 (dependent variable – log monthly wage). 
  Wage growth (t+1) - (t-1)    Wage growth  (t+2) - (t-1) 
  Job type  Edu. category    Job type  Edu. category  
High edu    0.360 
(53.79)*** 
   0.382 
(57.03)*** 
Medium edu    0.069 
(18.88)*** 
   0.075 
(20.79)*** 
High Edu * After    0.052 
(3.29)*** 
   0.031 
(1.93)** 
Med Edu. * After    -0.027 
(-4.61)*** 
   -0.079 
(-13.79)*** 
Low Edu  * After    -0.027 
(-4.31)*** 
   -0.080 
(-13.41)*** 
High job  0.385 
(77.11)*** 
   0.400 
(79.48)*** 
 
Medium job  0.099 
(30.71)*** 
   0.103 
(32.19)*** 
 
H-Skill Job  * After  -0.017 
(-1.82)* 
   -0.052 
(-5.41)*** 
 
M-Skill Job * After  -0.009 
(-1.70)* 
   -0.088 
(-16.68)*** 
 
L-Skill Job  * After  -0.058 
(-9.61)*** 


















(25.63)***    
Firm  characteristics  yes yes   yes  yes 
Time  dummies  yes yes   yes  yes 
R-squared  0.44 0.35   0.43  0.34 
No. of obs.  33 537  33 720    33 394  33 704 
Note: Firm-level characteristics include the firms’ capital intensity, size, profit per employee,  
share of females and industry affiliation.  
 
Table 6. Domestic takeovers of foreign-owned firms. Individual 
fixed-effect estimations (dependent variable – log monthly wage). 
  1   2   3   4  


























































Firm characteristics  no  yes  no  yes 
Time  dummies  yes  yes yes yes 
R-squared  0.34  0.34 0.34 0.34 
No. of observations  303 761  303 681  296 408  296 328 
Note: Firm-level characteristics include the firms’ capital intensity, size,  
profit per employee and industry affiliation. Fixed-effect estimations.  27
Table 7. The effect of foreign takeovers of Swedish firms on managers and CEOs in targeted firms. Individual fixed-effect estimations 
(dependent variable – log monthly wage).  
  Foreign acquisition of Swedish-owned firms.  Swedish acquisitions of 
foreign-owned MNCs. 










Vs foreign  
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Firm characteristics  yes  yes   yes   yes   yes   yes   yes  yes 
Time  dummies  yes  Yes yes  Yes Yes yes  yes    yes 
R-squared  0.35 0.33 0.36 0.35 0.33 0.36  0.34  0.34 
No. of observations  1 337 705  567 696  807 588  1 337 705  567 696  807 588  296 328  296 328 




















Table A1. Variable definitions. 
 Firm variables       
Profits per employee  Profits, net of financial deduction, 1990 year prices, 
divided by number of employees. 
FS 
Capital Intensity  Capital stock per employee, 1990-year prices.  FS 
Labor productivity  Value added per employee, 1990 year prices.  FS 
Foreign ownership  Dummy=1 if more than 50 percent of a firm’s votes 
are foreign owned. 
FS 
Size  Number of employees.  FS 
Female-share  Share of female employees.  RAMS 
        
Individual variables       
Wage  Full time equivalent monthly wage per employee, 
1990-year prices. Statistics Sweden has calculated 
these for both blue-collar and white collar workers. 
LS 
Female  Dummy = 1 if female, = 0 if male.  LS 
Blue-collar  Dummy = 1 if blue-collar worker, = 0 if white-collar 
worker. 
LS 
Education dummies  Based on the Swedish education nomenclature 
(SUN-codes). 
(1). Elementary school < 9 years  
(2). Compulsory school = 9 years  
(3). Upper secondary, 2 years  
(4). Upper secondary, 3 years  
(5). Upper secondary, 4 years  
(6). Undergraduate studies, 3 years  
(7). PhD.  
LS 
Experience Age  minus  number  of years of schooling minus 
seven. 
LS 
Note: Abbreviations: Financial Statistics (FS) and Individual Wage Statistics (LS). 
  
 